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Most attorneys try to sum up their casesin a fashion that comports withaccepted law and local practice. Alltoo frequently, however, one has themisfortune of running into Rambo, the
over-the-top opponent. Before his peroration is concluded,
Rambo has trampled on the law of trial practice by
making half a dozen improper arguments. He urges
evidence that never came up at trial. He injects hearsay
into the proceedings. He adds his own opinions about
which witnesses were lying and the legal fault of your
client. And, this is just the beginning. Adding insult to
injury, the unjust tactics often inure to Rambo's benefit.
He wins the case.
Applying antidotes to this sort of poison requires a
checklist of argument "do's" and "don'ts." Unless counsel
has the rules and perhaps some citations readily at hand, it
is impossible to forge an effective objection strategy. Yet,
only such a strategy has the potential to break an
opponent's stream of improprieties. In addition to inter-
rupting the outrageous opponent in a legally appropriate
way, there is another advantage: The well-placed contem-
poraneous objection usually provides the single avenue for
a successful appeal.
This article supplies the tools for the foregoing job.
Common objections have been isolated for treatment and
analysis. It is hoped that their inclusion will provide the
needed ammunition the next time an overly dramatic
opponent resorts to an improper tactic.
Objection Responsibilities
Before an attorney can complain about an improper
argument, countless Georgia cases underline the need for
the lawyer to make an objection and obtain a ruling from
the trial court.1 A similar rule applies in Georgia's federal
courts. Many arguments are subject to being stricken
upon challenge by opposing counsel. A highly practical
question centers on the role and the obligation of the
complaining attorney. Is a timely objection necessary to
ensure protection? Will the judge police the proceedings
on her own by interrupting or stopping the offending
counsel?
A 1993 case answers these questions. In Neal v.
Toyota Motor Corp. ,2 counsel for the injured plaintiffs in
a products liability action used his closing argument to
render what the court viewed as a "send the message"
argument. The court found the argument to be improper in
the context of the case, citing what it described as
counsel's effort "to incite the jury into a xenophobic
rage."3 However, defense counsel lodged no objection to
that part of the summation at trial. Defendant's lawyers
explained that they did not want to object and risk raising
the ire of the jury. The court held that this inaction was
fatal, preventing the trial court from granting the defense
motion for a new trial.
While a few arguments will indelibly taint a verdict
even in the absence of an objection, they are rare. A
timely objection to the closing argument is necessary, and
this rule applies even when the argument is inflammatory
and prejudicial. The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia provided a helpful formula
when it suggested that the prudent course of action for the
complaining counsel "would have been for Defendant to
object at the first mention of improper argument and again
raise the objection after [plaintiff's counsel] finished his
closing if he continued utilizing his improper remarks, as
he did here."4
The case of Haygood v. Auto-Owners Insurance
Co.5 further underlines the need for an objection. The
defense complained that the plaintiff's summation improp-
erly suggested misconduct by the insurer, and urged
reversible error. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit ruled that it was misleading for the
plaintiff's attorney to suggest that Auto-Owners was
hiding something. However, "at no time during or after the
closing arguments did Auto-Owners object on this ground,
nor did it ask for a limiting instruction, so the objection to
the closing argument is waived." 6
The bottom line is clear: When an opponent errs in his
manner of argument and it injures your case, object.
Object vigorously.7 Spotting the objectionable argument is
what the rest of this article is about.
Personal Beliefs of Counsel
What if counsel discredits opposing witnesses by
telling the jury his belief that they lied when they testified?
It might come out something like this: "Ladies and gentle-
men, don't follow the path laid out by plaintiff's expert on
damages. I have investigated this case, and I know things
about him. He is a prostitute for hire. I believe that this
'expert' was lying when he swore there were permanent
injuries here." Such an argument merits objection on more
than a single ground, but certainly one of them should be:
"Objection, improper opinion by counsel."
While a few "I believe" statements mark the argu-
ments of most attorneys, they become inappropriate when
they refer to the guilt or fault of an opposing party or the
credibility of witnesses, as illustrated in the foregoing
paragraph. A prosecutor can neither announce to the jury
that she believes in the truthfulness of a specific prosecu-
tion witness in the case and not the defendant nor
proclaim her belief that the accused is guilty.9 However, in
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order to make out a violation
of the personal opinion rule,
objecting counsel needs to
establish that there was a
clear expression of personal
belief by one's opponent on
a prohibited topic.'° This
generally requires a showing
that one's adversary
referenced the guilt or fault
of the objecting party, or
slandered the credibility of a
witness by offering
counsel's personal expres-
sion of disbelief.
Vouching
This impropriety is a variant of the "no personal
opinion" rule. An objection can be made when counsel
improperly bolsters her own witness by personally vouch-
ing for the witness' truthfulness. The Supreme Court of
Georgia has made it clear that a prosecutor may not
vouch for the character of a witness.II Promising or
assuring the jury that counsel knows that a witness
testified truthfully does this, and abridges the rule. How-
ever, it is again the case that some fine line-drawing
occurs. To be improper, the endorsement of a witness'
truthfulness must be clearly evident. More modest state-
ments of witness support simply fall into the category of
appropriately arguing inferences from the evidence."
Argument Outside the Record
In closing argument, counsel is allowed to draw
reasonable inferences from the testimony. In doing so, the
attorney may enrich the argument with references and
illustrations regarding matters of common public knowl-
edge. It is here that verbal techniques such as quotations
from the Bible 3 or lines from well-known literary works
play a role. While care must be exercised in employing
Biblical passages, 14 appellate courts have approved such
references.15 One federal court even adjudicated the
propriety of quoting columnist Ann Landers: "There is
nothing improper in a civil case with a lawyer's citing
widely recognized authorities during a closing statement
(though Shakespeare and the Bible come more readily to
mind than Ann Landers); on the contrary, this is some-
times an effective, and certainly a time-honored method of
argument."' 6 The concurring opinion added: "[C]ounsel
should be given wide latitude in closing argument and
should be able to use allegory or resort to metaphor
borrowed from literature,
current events and the
like.""1
Georgia courts give
lawyers wide latitude in
their closing arguments
and allow them to draw
upon well-established
historical and commonly
known facts to illustrate
points. When counsel
takes the limited license to
embellish an argument to
extremes, however, an
objection based upon
"matters outside the
record" should be sus-
tained.18 Prohibited are
references to factual data never produced at trial or
argument of excluded matter that was stricken by the
court. Reversal is required where the prejudicial state-
ments of an attorney reflect a studied purpose to deflect
the jury's attention from the issues. Where an argument is
not supported by the evidence, such an argument can
inject a false issue into the case and amount to reversible
error. 19
Golden Rule Arguments
When a trial lawyer invites the jury to step into the
shoes of the party she represents, the lawyer may have
violated the "Golden Rule" prohibition.0 In a products
liability or personal injury case, a plaintiff's attorney might
tell the jury: "Remember my client's pain as he sits next to
me. Award a substantial money verdict in this case. Please
do unto my client as you would have him do unto you, if you
were in his chair as the plaintiff and he were in yours,
sitting in judgment." Similarly, a defense attorney might tell
the jury to "imagine if you were in the defendant's position.
Would you want to be bankrupted by a big judgment, like
the one the plaintiff has requested? Don't do to the defen-
dant what you would not want done to yourself!"
Encouraging juror self-identification with one of the
parties has drawn appellate court criticism. Most decisions
condemn such arguments as improper distractions from
the jury's sworn duty to decide cases based on logic and
reason rather than emotion. A 1996 Georgia case defines
as prohibited Golden Rule rhetoric any argument that
"urges the jurors to place themselves in the position of
plaintiff or to allow such recovery as they would wish if in
the same position. It is improper because it asks the jurors
to consider the case, not objectively as fair and impartial
GEORGIA BAR JOURNAL
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jurors, but rather from the biased, subjective standpoint of
a litigant."21
Golden Rule objections are not within the exclusive
province of civil cases. In criminal practice, another 1996
Georgia case adverts to the principle that prosecution
arguments inviting the jury to identify with the complaining
witness will be carefully scrutinized.22 A summation that
importunes the jury to place itself in the position of the
victim can violate the Golden Rule prohibition.
Perhaps the major exception to the Golden Rule
restriction occurs when a defense attorney in a criminal
assault case is defending on self-defense grounds. An
instruction frequently allows the jury in such cases to
assess whether the accused reasonably defended himself
against injury when the situation is viewed from the
defendant's standpoint at the time. 23
As with many forms of objectionable argument,
counsel for the party against whom the Golden Rule
argument is used must object. In most cases, the right to
effectively complain that opposing counsel made a Golden
Rule argument is all but lost if an objection is not made.-4
Name Calling
Trial counsel might be jarred in her chair when an
opponent starts his closing something like this: "Members
of the jury, the defendant is a liar and his lawyer is nothing
but his mouthpiece." In all segments of society, use of
caustic personal canards seems to be on the rise. As
incivility at trial increases, so does the incidence of
personal attacks.
An objection that counsel's argument partakes of
name-calling will sometimes lie when unduly colorful
characterizations are employed. However, this is a field
where fine lines divide the proper from the improper. In
one closing argument, counsel remarked that the opposing
party was "a cheapskate, a scheming
low-down pup, cheating and swindling,
stealing and waiting like a snake in the
grass. '25 While reversal may be
required when appellations become
overzealous, the court held that the line
was not crossed in this case. Nor was
reversible error found in another case
where a prosecutor described the
defendant as an "animal" and "snake,"
although the court found the character-
izations to be undesirable. 26
When it is not the accused but an
ordinary witness in a civil or criminal
case who is the target of remarks,
inflammatory descriptions are to be
avoided. On the other hand, it is legitimate to discuss the
character of a witness and to characterize his testimony.
What if it is not a witness upon whom the calumny is
heaped, but rather opposing counsel? Georgia courts have
ruled that a personal reference during closing argument is
particularly objectionable if it refers to the opponent's
lawyer. Again, however, while unflattering characteriza-
tions are often disapproved, it is rare that such a situation
rises to the level of reversible error.27
Ethnic References
It has long been the rule in Georgia and other jurisdic-
tions that appeals to racial or religious prejudice in closing
arguments will be condemned.2" The Supreme Court of
Michigan reviewed an appeal wherein a prosecutor and a
witness had repeatedly commented regarding a party's
ethnic heritage. At trial, several references were made to
Arab ethnicity, the first occurring during the prosecutor's
opening statement.2 9 The court was asked to decide
whether use of the terms "Arab" and "Iraqi" at a trial
conducted during the Persian Gulf War deprived defen-
dant of a fair trial.
After remarking that it abhorred the injection of racial or
ethnic remarks into any trial because it may arouse prejudice, the
court pointed out that not all references fall into this category.3
"In the instant case, most of the comments were improper and
possibly irrelevant. Nonetheless, we find the comments, viewed
in context, to be innocuous, unintended, and not of a degree that
prejudiced defendant's right to a fair trial."'" Thus, no intent to
inflame was found. The court, however, sounded an alarm for
future cases wherein prejudicial intent is manifest, stating that
"[w]hen an attempt is made to arouse ethnic prejudices, the rule
of reversal appears universal."32
Wealth of Party
Comments upon the wealth of a
party are often disapproved.33 When a
plaintiff suggests to the jury that the
defendant can afford to pay and this
alone justifies a verdict against him, the
argument can be stopped by objection.
Conversely, a corporate or other
plaintiff with resources cannot be
denied recovery on a just claim on the
ground that "they don't need the
money, so why give them an award."
There are exceptions. Punitive
damage cases often provide an
CONTINUED ON PAGE 63
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Continued frim page 15
example. In a case, or during the phase of a case,
wherein information regarding the defendant's resources
is relevant to a judgment that will adequately punish and
deter, counsel may appropriately refer to those resources
in closing.34
War on Crime
Sometimes a lawyer urges the jury to make war on
some societal ill by holding it against a party in the instant
case. In a federal criminal case in Georgia, the prosecutor
urged the jury to view the defendants as enemies in the war
on drugs. 5 In part, the argument observed that the commu-
nity was involved in a war that is fought in the streets, in the
schools, "and it has been fought in this Courtroom for the
past week."36 The prosecutor urged that: "unless we win
the war, we will all be doomed. These people, as well as
everyone listed in that indictment, are the enemy and they
are the enemies of every man, woman, and child in this
country because they don't care what they do. They don't
care [sic] the pain and the misery and the hurt and the
death that they cause because they only want one thing,
and that's money for themselves."37
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit did not condone the argument. In a note to the
opinion, the court found that "the remarks at issue here
clearly were intended to make the jury angry at [defen-
dants] Boyd and Clowers. Prosecutors have a responsibil-
ity not only to prosecute cases diligently, but also to refrain
from improper methods in doing so."" In the end, how-
ever, the court employed a harmless error analysis to
prevent the argument from overturning the convictions.
Send a Message
Courts around the country have debated the propriety
of "send a message" arguments. The rhetoric might come
out like this, in a case involving a slip and fall on a stair-
way: "Members of the jury, send a message to the
landlords of this city that steps and stairs for tenants
cannot be maintained in the slipshod fashion that Joe
Defendant maintained the stairway in this case."
In Georgia, "send a message" arguments are not
warmly received in civil cases.39 Recent case law
suggests, however, that criminal cases are different. In
1997, the Georgia Supreme Court held that "[I]t is not
improper for a prosecutor to appeal to a jury to convict in
order to 'send a message' to the community."4 ° The
Georgia Court of Appeals has followed suit.41
Other objections
The foregoing nonexhaustive list highlights numerous
practical objections. There are others: Addressing jurors by
name, 2 improper references to insurance,43 inflammatory
appeals," and inspiring apprehension on the part of the jury
in a noncapital criminal case by describing the dangerous
nature of the defendant are all improper.' These tactics can
be resisted by prompt objections. While a few argument
violations are so serious that they will be reviewed in the
absence of a timely challenge, appellate relief from an alleged
argument error almost invariably requires that an objection
appear in the record. Other remedies can also be considered
depending upon the violation, like ajury instruction to disre-
gard counsel's remark or a request for a mistrial.
Checklist of objections
The foregoing sections have pinpointed numerous
objections to improper summations. A list of relevant
objections to final argument may be helpful at this point.
" Addressing jurors by name
" Appeal to prejudice
" Arguing matter outside the record
" Comment on defendant's failure to testify in a
criminal case
• Disparaging party in a prejudicial manner
" Evidence misstated
" Excluded matter argued
" Golden Rule
" Insurance
• Misstating the law
* Name calling
" Personal attack on counsel, party or witness
" Personal opinion on merits of case
" Racial, religious, ethnic or regional bias
" Vouching personally for witness
" Wealth of party pilloried46
Conclusion
The network of guidelines surrounding closing argu-
ment provide objections capable of controlling the over-
zealous courtroom orator. The list of these must be readily
at hand at the end of a case. Swiftness and accuracy
must be the hallmarks of counsel's challenges to improper
argument. 47 H
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